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Ninety years ago, A. C. Freeman expressed his surprise at the
frequency and the assurance with which the most irreconcilable con-
clusions as to the law of judgments had been announced. "Cases have
frequently been disposed of," he complained, "in accordance with
principles which the Court evidently regarded as indisputable, but
which, in fact, were in direct conflict with the law as understood in
most other states."1 This disharmony is no longer surprising inas-
much as we have abandoned our pretense that there is an omnipresent
symphony of reason which keeps our decisions in step. What is per-
haps surprising, however, is the general absence of dispute on the
choice of law problems presented by such divergencies.
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws has dispatched the problem
with a half section which declares that "the effect of a valid judgment
as a conclusive adjudication between the parties and persons in privy
with them of facts which were or might have been put in issue in the
proceedings is determined by the law of the state where the judgment
was rendered."' A comment to this section further explains that
the same law determines who is in privity with the parties to the judg-
ment so long as privity is not imposed upon persons over whom the
state has no jurisdiction3 Judicial declarations which support this
rule are abundant, but amazingly few cases can be found which present
the issue squarely, and never has a court engaged in an informed effort
to resolve it.
The application of the Restatement rule which has been most
litigated pertains to the problem of merger through judgment. The
New York courts have deferred to the law of the place rendering
the judgment to determine its effect as a bar on a later New York action
asserting an alleged joint liability against another defendant. 4 Mass-
achusetts has, however, applied its own law in making the determin-
ation.' When the issue was presented for determination by a Call-
* Associate Professor of Law, College of Law, The Ohio State University.
1 Freeman, Judgments 1 (1st ed. 1873).
2 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 450(2) (1934). See also Cheatham, "Res Judicata
and the Full Faith and Credit Clause," 44 Colum. L. Rev. 330, 346-48 (1944); Ehrenz-
weig, Conflict of Laws 233 (1962) ; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 633-636 (3d ed. 1949);
Leflar, Conflict of Laws 133-134 (1959).
3 Comment d. The qualification is compelled by the holding in Bigelow v. Old
Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912).
4 Suydam v. Barber, 18 N.Y. 468 (1858); Crehan v. Megargel, 199 App. Div. 649,
192 N.Y. Supp. 290 (1922). But cf. Hinchey v. Sellers, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 165 N.E.2d 156 (1959).
0 Odom v. Denny, 82 Mass. 114 (1860) (no conflict stated).
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fornia court, it was avoided by a decision that there was not, after all,
a real conflict.6
Often the suggestion is made that such a reference to the law
of the forum rendering the judgment is required by the full faith
and credit clause or its implementing legislation.7 The statute does
provide that judgments "shall have such faith and credit given to them in
every court within the United States as they have by law or usage
in the courts of the state from which they are taken."' Literally, this
could mean that judgments shall have the same range of effect in all
states as they have where they were rendered. It is, however, far too
late to be literal in the use of this statute; many departures from its
literal mandate have been countenanced. 9 Perhaps the most striking
of these departures is found in the McCartin0 case, where it was held
that a compensation award made in Illinois did not bar further com-
pensation in a Wisconsin proceeding despite its effect in barring a
second Illinois award. But there have been other compromises, as
must have been expected by the draftsmen of the full faith and credit
clause, for complete loyalty to the language would seem to require
that process should issue on the judgment of a sister state, and this
has until very recently been unthinkable."
It is not enough, therefore, to cite the general charter; an adequate
solution requires some consideration of the purpose of the full faith
and credit mandate and the utility of its application. History, such
as there is, is of little help;'" one may speculate that the drafters had
6 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 720, 132 P.2d 70, 94
(1942): "In view of the uncertainty as to which law governs in determining whether a
prior judgment bars an action against one not a party thereto, we prefer to leave that
question undecided and to place our decision on the ground that if the New York law
controls, that law does not bar the present suit against defendant."
7 See, e.g., United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607, 620, 621 (3d Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 825 (1948).
8 Rev. Stat. § 705 (1878), 25 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958).
9 See generally Reese & Johnson, "The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judg-
ments," 49 Colum. L. Rev. 153 (1949). But cf. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,
294 (1942): "Such exceptions have been few and far between .... "
10 Industrial Comm'n v. McCarrin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947). Cf. Yarborough v. Yar-
borough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933).
11 Federal court judgments are registrable in other federal courts throughout the
nation. 28 U.S.C. § 1963. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have proposed a
partial step in this direction for state court judgments with the Uniform Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments Act. 9A Uniform Laws Annotated 287 (1957).
12 Cook, "The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause," 28
Yale L.J. 421 (1919); Corwin, "The Full Faith and Credit Clause," 81 U. Pa. L. Rev.
371 (1933); Radin, "The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History," 39
Ill. L. Rev. 1 (1944); Ross, "'Full Faith and Credit' in a Federal System," 20 Minn. L.
Rev. 140 (1936).
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it in mind that no state should become a sanctuary for fugitive debtors
by forcing the creditors in pursuit to relitigate their claims. The
basic concept nevertheless seems fairly clear that it is indecorous for
one member of a federal system to undo what another has wrought.
This principle seems to have little application to the problem of the
choice of law on the issue of the range of effect of a foreign judgment.
It would not seem unduly to deprive an Indiana judgment of its
dignity to give it the same effect in later Ohio litigation which a like
Ohio judgment would have. 3 This may be especially clear where the
foreign law of judgments which the Restatement would apply is pe-
culiarly ill-suited to interstate litigation so that the full faith and credit
policy is counterbalanced by weightier considerations. And surely there
is no purpose of the full faith and credit principles which has appli-
cation to prevent an Ohio court from giving broader effect to a foreign
judgment than it would have where rendered.
The case often cited as holding that full faith and credit require
an application of the prior forum's law of judgments is Hancock
National Bank v. Farnum.14 The Court did there hold that Rhode
Island could not permit a shareholder defending an action by a corp-
orate creditor to recover on unpaid shares in a Kansas corporation
to relitigate the corporation's liability after it had been established
in an earlier Kansas suit. It would seem, however, that it is the
Kansas law of corporations rather than the Kansas law of judgments
to which Rhode Island should give effect. The superior claim of Kansas
law in maintaining even treatment of all unpaid shareholders seems
obvious. Either all should be privileged to relitigate or none. Indeed,
it would not seem to matter whether the first action against the corp-
oration had been in Kansas or elsewhere; still Kansas law should
determine the effect of such a judgment on suits against the share-
holders. This analysis of the case is reinforced by its comparison with
Ingersoll v. Corum,16 which established that Massachusetts is not
bound to regard its ancillary administrator as bound by a prior decision
adverse to a Montana administrator of the same estate.
The reference to the prior forum's law indicated by the Restatement
may also be justified on occasion by the requirements of fairness to
the defendant. This can be seen in cases in which plaintiffs seek to
13 Cf. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., supra note 3, at 133: "The
effect of the full faith and credit clause is to put the judgment of a court of one State,
when sued upon or pleaded in estoppel in the courts of another state, upon the plane of
a domestic judgment in respect of conclusiveness as to facts adjudged." See also Tucker
v. Turner, 195 Ark. 632, 113 S.W.2d 508, 570 (1933).
14 176 U.S. 640 (1900).
x5 211 U.S. 335 (1908).
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enforce invalid foreign judgments. Often, of course, the result in such
cases is required by the due process clause because of the constitutional
impotence of the court rendering the judgment.'6 But it also seems
clearly established that a judgment infected by a failure to comply
with the validation requirements imposed by the state which exceed
the constitutional requirements is also not enforceable in other juris-
dictions with less stringent requirements.' 7 What seems to be involved
besides due process considerations is another principle of estoppel: a
plaintiff who has chosen to draw the defendant into combat according
to the rules of the first forum should not be permitted to forsake his
choice and invoke the more lenient rules of a second forum retroactive-
ly to the first action. This principle was developed and applied in
Public Works v. Columbia College's to estop a plaintiff from his at-
tempted reliance on a Virginia judgment which was not final and
hence not yet a bar to further Virginia litigation on the matters in
dispute. It can also be illustrated in a more recent case in which
the judgment was valid, but of limited effect. In Gilmer v. Spitalny,'"
a California court held that the plaintiff could not use his Arizona
judgment, rendered in rem against the defendant's community prop-
er.ty in Arizona, as a basis for a collateral estoppel in the later Cali-
fornia action to impose personal liability, where no such estoppel would
be recognized in Arizona. It would seem that the plaintiff's initial
choice of the Arizona forum affords a basis for an estoppel offsetting
that which he seeks to assert against the defendant. A similar result
might be expected where the plaintiff chooses to commence a quasi-
in-rem action in a jurisdiction which recognizes the defendant's right
to make a limited appearance; 20 he should not be permitted to negate
the limitation by a later suit for the deficiency in a jurisdiction not
recognizing the limited appearance in its own courts.2' The limitations
of this principle can be seen in the foreign land decree embroglio. 22
16 Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457 (1874).
17 Forrest v. Fey, 218 Ill. 165, 75 N.E. 789 (1905); Norris v. Dunn, 184 Ark. 511,
43 S.W.2d 77 (1931). But zf. Pemberton v. Hughes, [1899] 1 Ch. 781.
18 84 U.S. 521 (1873). The opinion, at 529, seems to suggest that this result is
constitutionally required on inexplicit grounds, but there seems to be no full faith and
credit problem and the possible injustice of a contrary decision seems hardly sufficient
to challenge the due process requirements.
19 84 Cal. App. 2d 39, 189 P.2d 744 (1948). But cf. Harnishfeger Sales Corp. v.
Sternberg Dredging Co., 189 Miss. 73, 191 So. 94 (1939), modification refused on
rehearing, 195 So. 322 (1940).
20 See, e.g., Miller Bros. v. State, 201 Md. 535, 95 A.2d 286 (1953).
21 See, e.g., Sands v. Lefcourt, 117 A.2d 365 (Del. 1955). Cf. Combs v. Combs, 249
Ky. 155, 60 S.W.2d 368 (1933).
22 See generally Currie, "Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees," 21 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 620 (1954).
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Although it has been held that no court has sufficient jurisdiction over
foreign land to entitle its decree of transfer to full faith and credit
at the situs, -3 there is surely no unfairness in the increasingly popular
practice of giving such decrees a binding effect despite their lack of
constitutional status.24
In addition to the justifications, the Restatement rule can also
claim the obvious virtue of simplicity. Unlike other foreign law which
may be urged upon the forum, the judgment comes clearly labelled
so that there is no room for dispute as to its source. Thus, uniformity
in all fifty states is a realistic expectation. This serves to increase the
plaintiff's range of vision when he seeks to foretell the consequences
of his litigation, and it has special appeal to those who share the popular
dread of forum-shopping; but it, also, is not a universal solvent. This
single additional anchor of certainty adds little to what the attentive
plaintiff may anticipate without it and surely there is no special need
for uniformity, no special hazard of forum-shopping, which can be
attributed to the law of judgments. Indeed, where the forum chooses
to apply its broader concept of res judicata against the plaintiff, it
reduces the opportunities for shopping. As many concessions as we
are forced to make in our halting pursuit of uniformity, it would seem
arbitrary to be absolutist with reference to this single problem.
None of the supporting reasons for the Restatement rule justify
its breadth. And, to the contrary, Professors Currie25 and Ehrenzweig2 6
have been most vocal of late in demonstrating the advantages of a
general preference for forum law. The application of foreign law, like
the application of the Erie doctrine,2 7 requires the court to try to think
with the minds of others-a process so difficult that it seems often to
frustrate all thought. This process may be especially dangerous in
dealing with a principle like res judicata which is procedural in form
but which often disguises more substantive considerations not discussed
in the opinions which supply the image that the court is called upon
to reflect. And, as Professor Currie has observed, a decision that a
foreign rule as to the effect of a judgment should override the applic-
23 Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
24 McElreath v. McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961); Sullivan v.
Sullivan, 168 Neb. 850, 97 SAV.2d 348 (1959); Lyle Cushion Co. v. McKendrick, 227
Miss. S94, 87 So. 2d 289 (1956).
25 Currie, "Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws," 1959 Duke
L.J. 171.
26 Ehrenzweig, "The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws," 58 Mich. L.
Rev. 637 (1960).
27 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a discussion of the problem in
the state-federal context, see Note, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1299 (1946).
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able local policy to the contrary does make an unseemly claim by the
court to a global wisdom not possessed." It would seem therefore
that the broad rule of the Restatement with all its supporting judicial
dicta should be accepted with some caution. There may well be
occasions when exceptions, at least, may be justified.
Anticipating such exceptions requires a closer analysis of the
types of choices which might arise. The unfolding law of judgments
exhibits as its principal feature a modern impatience with piecemeal
litigation.2 9 The trend favoring a broadening of the impact of former
adjudication is found in a variety of principles which serve to lay con-
troversies to rest not on the classical grounds that the parties have al-
ready been heard, but for the stated reason that they have had an
opportunity for a full hearing, or at least that one of them has. We
may consider three recent Ohio cases as examples,
In Rush v. Maple Heights, ° the court held that the plaintiff was
barred from asserting a claim for personal injury because she had had
an opportunity to do so earlier in an action in which she had recovered
for property damage occuring in the same accident. Such a holding
would not have occurred under the old common-law writ system, but
code pleading introduced the concept of the cause of action which has
been invoked, as it was in the Rush case, to bar a plaintiff who would
seek to "split" his cause between two actions. The holding serves to
complicate the situation where an insurer has subrogated to the prop-
erty damage claim and is inconsistent with English3 and New York32
holdings, among others, to the effect that the property damage and
personal injury claims are separate causes of action which may be
separately maintained. But it is consistent with the majority view33
and with the contemporary lust for total litigation.
It is useful for our purpose to ask whether a different result should
be expected if the first action to recover property damage had gone
to judgment in New York. Would Ohio abandon the rule of the Rush
case and apply the New York rule permitting the second action, as it
has been directed by the Restatement? It may be suggested that there
is here no affront to the full faith and credit principle if Ohio adheres
to its own rule: the New York proceeding would in no way be depre-
ciated and there is no invitation to forum-shopping. Indeed, that evil
28 Fall v. Eastin, supra note 23, at 176-177.
29 Note, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 820 (1952).
30 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N.E.2d 599 (1958).
31 Brunsden v. Humphrey, 14 Q.B.D. 141 (1884).
32 Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., 170 N.Y. 40, 62 N.E. 772 (1902).
33 For a collection of cases, see Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 327, 61
N.E.2d 707, 712 (1945).
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would be reduced by forcing the plaintiff to continue his fragmented
litigation in New York, where fragmentation is permissible. This pos-
sibility also seems to eliminate any unfairness to the plaintiff of the
sort which may sometimes justify the Restatement rule. Surely the
defendant cannot be said to have made an election by litigating in New
York which should estop him from later asserting the Rush rule in
Ohio. The hope of uniformity is entitled to some weight if it is de-
sirable to permit the New York plaintiff to assess the consequences of
his lawsuit on the basis of knowledge of the New York law of judg-
ments. The likelihood of such analysis and reliance seems slight. And
the expectation is disappointed only in the event the defendant with-
draws from New York and becomes unavailable for service of process
there before commencement of the second suit. In any event, this
factor of reliance seems to carry little weight with the Ohio court for
the Rush case was decided adversely to a plaintiff who had quite rea-
sonably relied on the opinions of the Ohio Supreme Court in believing
that such a split would be permitted. 4 We are thus left with little
reason for the application of the New York rule, other than loyalty
to the simple rule of the Restatement. This would seem to be counter-
balanced by an equal loyalty to the simple rule of the Rush case for
the rationale of the decision seems equally applicable whether the
former adjudication occured in New York or Ohio. It is, after all, the
Ohio court which the plaintiff has proposed to employ; inasmuch as
its docket is to bear the burden and its defendant harassed, the Ohio
court would seem to have sufficient interest in the issue to resolve it
according to its own lights.
Comparable to the Rush case is the decision in Schimke v. Early,35
in which the court held the plaintiff in an action against a servant
to be bound by an earlier adverse decision in an action against the
master for the servant's negligence. Chief Justice Weygandt, speak-
ing for the majority, hurdled the problem of the difference in
parties by declaring the servant to be in privity with the master; thus
the parties to the two actions are substantially identical and the former
adjudication is conclusive of the second action. The generally accepted
rule applied to the obverse situation in which the plaintiff first sues
the servant, is that he is bound by an adverse judgment and cannot
later sue the master for the same claim. 6 This result has been deemed
necessary to protect the master's right of indemnity and has been re-
34 Cf. Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., supra note 33; Mansker v. Dealers Transport Co., 160
Ohio St. 255, 116 N.E.2d 3 (1953).
35 173 Ohio St. 521, 184 N.E,2d 209 (1962), noted 24 Ohio St. L.J. 406 (1963).
36 Restatement, Judgments § 99 (1942); Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v.
Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937).
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garded as an exception to the historic requirement of mutuality as
a condition of an estoppel of the sort urged by the defendant who did
not participate in the successful defense of the first action. The
Schimke decision was not required by such considerations and was not
an application of this narrow exception to the mutuality rule but was
a different departure, despite the disguising language of the opinion
which finds master and servant in "privity." Judge Taft, in concur-
ring, preferred to rely on a California case which expressed a root-
and-branch rejection of the mutuality rule.17 A majority of the Ohio
court may ultimately accept this position, but meanwhile it is probably
safer to treat the decision as an application of a broader exception to
the mutuality rule which permits the use of the forum judgment by a
second defendant whose alleged liability is "derivative" of the liability
which the plaintiff sought to impose on the first. Professors Moore
and Currier have recently claimed 38 that this distinction explains most
of the case law; as an exception to the general rule of mutuality, it
has received a modest indorsement from the Restatement of Judg-
ments.3 9 But, as Professor Currie has demonstrated, it is not con-
sistent with the classical theory of mutuality.40 We may, therefore, in
pursuit of our present inquiry, ask whether the Ohio court should
have been troubled if the first action against the master had been
brought in a jurisdiction whose latest and highest authority yet clings
to a vigorous concept of mutuality which would prevent the servant
from using the master's successful defense in a later action brought
against him in the same jurisdiction. What purpose would be served
by deference to such a rule? There is surely no derogation of the
foreign proceeding in applying forum law. Nor is there affront to the
requirements of fairness, for again, the plaintiff is free to continue
his piecemeal litigation in the place where he started it, where he has
had one full hearing on the merits of the claim. And the defendant cer-
tainly cannot be estopped from asserting the bar by reason of his
participation in the earlier litigation, for indeed there was none. We
are thus again left with a choice between loyalty to the simple rule
of choice of law espoused by the Restatement and loyalty to the forum
court's rule and its own best judgment about the propriety of continued
37 173 Ohio St. 521, 525, 184 N.E.2d 209, 211, citing Bernhard v. Bank of America
Nat'l Sav. & Trust Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
38 Moore and Currier, "Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments," 35 Tul. L.
Rev. 301 (1961).
39 Restatement, Judgments § 99 (1942).
40 "Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrines," 9 Stan. L.
Rev. 281 (1957).
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litigation. The choice would seem to weigh clearly in favor of forum
law.
In both of the examples considered, it was suggested that the
forum might apply its more stringent rule. Obviously, the considera-
tions dictated by the full faith and credit clause become more pressing
if the laws are reversed, so that the forum would be applying the more
restrictive two-action or mutuality rules.41 Even here, however, it is not
clear that full faith and credit compels application of the Restatement
rule. Significant, for comparison, is the rule that a foreign judgment
based on the staleness of the plaintiff's claim is not "on the merits"
and hence not entitled to full faith and credit.' This clearly gives less
effect to the judgment than it possesses where rendered and violates the
Conflicts Restatement rule; the stated justification is a characteriza-
tion that the limitation is remedial only and intended only for use in
local courts. The same claim can be made, with perhaps more justifica-
tion, for the law of judgments.
Furthermore, a distinction can be made between effects of the
foreign judgment which are direct and those which are collateral. 3
To accord the judgment less effect in actions which expose the judg-
ment to direct attack would, indeed, be to undo what has been wrought
by a sister state. Where, however, the judgment is collateral to the
second action, a decision to disregard it in the disposition of the latter
does not disturb the finality of the judgment. So long as the disregard
accords with the forum's practice in dealing with like judgments of
its own, it does not seem excessively insulting to the sister forum.
To be sure, the characterization argument and the direct-col-
lateral distinction have little intrinsic worth. An escape from the con-
stitutional compulsion is the most these afford. But there may be
situations where this freedom to apply a more conservative (less
modernistic) rule would be welcome. This is most likely to be true in
situations in which the expansive view of res judicata seems less just
because of the interstate character of the litigation.
It may be helpful here to advert to Home v. Woolever,44 in which
41 The federal courts in Arkansas have recently deferred to the Oklahoma law against
splitting, but the opinion reflects meager consideration of the problem. Gentry v. Jett,
273 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1960).
42 Warner v. Buffalo Drydock Co., F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291
U.S. 678 (1934); Equity Corp. v. Groves, 53 A.2d 505 (Del. Ch. 1947); Harris v. Quine
4 Q.B. 652 (1869); Restatement, Judgments § 49, comment a (1942). But cf. United
States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290 (1922).
43 The distinction is, of course, basic to the conceptualism of the Restatement of
Judgments. A hint of its possible relevance to this issue is made in Equity Corp. v.
Groves, supra note 39.
44 170 Ohio St. 178, 163 N.E.2d 378 (1959).
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the Ohio court gave effect to the Federal Rule on compulsory counter-
claims.45 That Rule requires defendants in federal litigation to assert
all claims arising from the transaction which provides the basis of the
complaint, upon pain of being denied a later hearing on such claims.
Its purpose, like the rules of decision in the Rush and Schimke cases,
is to induce "total litigation," to discourage piecemeal retaliation. It is,
indeed, an analogue to the rule of the Rush case forbidding plaintiffs to
split their causes, for it applies a similar and broader injunction against
defendants. It has the unaccustomed result of permitting the counter-
claim defendant (the plaintiff) to choose his claimant's forum. Perhaps
for this reason, it has not yet been adopted for most state courts, in-
cluding Ohio's. But the Home case nevertheless held that a defendant
in an Ohio federal suit could not later assert in state court a claim which
he was required by the Federal Rule to assert in the federal case. The
outcome was doubtless influenced by considerations of state-federal
comity and by the facts that the earlier federal action had been re-
moved to the federal court by the then defendant, and that the earlier
action had been dismissed as a result of a settlement probably intended
by the original plaintiff to resolve the whole dispute. The decision
nevertheless indicates the willingness of the Ohio court to regard as
.concluded a dispute on which neither party had actually been heard.
It is in this regard another expression of the contemporary develop-
ment and the rejection of the classical view expressed, with regard to
the same problem, in a recent Mississippi holding.46
It is most pertinent to our study to question whether the result in
Horne v. Woolever might differ if the former adjudication had occurred
in a state court in Missouri, for instance, which has a compulsory
counterclaim rule.47 It is suggested that such a difference might be
expected if the defendant is an Ohioan who was unwillingly drawn into
combat in Missouri. The attractions of the compulsory counterclaim
rule are considerably dissipated when it is applied to nonresident defend-
ants whose relation to the forum may be very attenuated in the light of
emerging concepts of personal jurisdiction.48 Those responsible for
the Federal Rule have conceded this in their comment on the recent Rules
amendments which would prevent the application of the compulsory
counterclaim Rule to defendants in proceedings initiated by attach-
45 Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (a).
46 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Haney, 235 Miss. 60, 108 So. 2d 277, cert. denied, 360 U.S.
917 (1959). Contra, Jocie Motor Lines, Inc. v. Johnson, 231 N.C. 367, 57 S.E.2d 388
(1956).
47 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 509.420 (1949).
48 See Note, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909 (1960).
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ment or garnishment.49 There may even be constitutional problems
presented by the application of the compulsion to counterclaim against
defendants who have been served with constructive process only and
whose counterclaims do not relate to the activities in the state which
justify the fictional service." Short of this limitation, however, it would
seem proper for courts to recognize the extra harshness of the total
litigation concept as applied to interstate situations and to mitigate it by
the use of a more conservative forum rule.
The foregoing analysis is surely open to the criticism that it is
forced: it deals with problems that have not arisen. Partly, of course,
this article serves the champertous purpose of promoting more knowl-
edgeable litigation which will present some of the issues discussed. But
it is also thought that the hypotheticality of the treatment serves to
illustrate the unreality of the conventional conflicts approach to the
problem which is expressed in the Restatement. As Justice Traynor has
recently observed,' the choice of law issue is often a bogus one; so it
has been here. Although these more difficult situations have not arisen,
the Restatement and many courts have offered to propose solutions
which can only encumber the work of decision when it becomes
necessary. Meanwhile, the starting point proposed by our most active
contemporary commentators5 2 seems valid in its present application:
our courts should determine the collateral consequences of foreign
judgments according to their own best wisdom until some compelling
reason for departing from that wisdom is demonstrated to apply to the
case at hand.
49 Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure
for the United States District Courts (1961).
50 Cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 319 (1945).
GI Traynor, "Is This Conflict Really Necessary?," 37 Texas L. Rev. 657 (1959).
52 See Currie, supra note 25; Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 2.
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